The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has, quietly, become a very effective counter-terror agency. The arrest of international arms dealers Victor Bout and Monzar al-Kasser (in operations worthy of movie scripts) were only one example. The agency had at least a peripheral role in the Betancourt rescue – a DEA operation inserted bugged satellite phones into the FARC, a crucial tactic that has made a tremendous contribution to the FARC’s overall breakdown. In general the agency seems to have adapted well overall to the counter-terror mission, among other things doing a competent job at building up its analytical capabilities.
Last Friday, the DEA’s chief of operations Michael Braun gave a presentation at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy (hosted by co-CT Blogger and Washington Institute Fellow Michael Jacobson) that provided important insight into the DEA’s adaptation to the counter-terror mission.
While many pundits give lip-service to “changing organizational culture” it is an issue that is generally not given its due. Policy and political issues are “sexier.” But organizational issues are in fact central to any complex problem of governance. In their classic Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow argue that one conceptual model useful for understanding government behavior is:
…less as deliberate choices and more as outputs of large organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behavior…. To perform complex tasks, the behavior of large numbers of individuals must be coordinated. Coordination requires standard operating procedures: rules according to which things are done….
At any given time, a government consists of existing organizations, each with a fixed set of standard operating procedures and programs. The behavior of these organizations-and relevant to an issue in any particular instance is, therefore, determined primarily by routines established prior to that instance….
Chief Braun’s presentation hit many of these points. First, in the decades prior to 9/11 the DEA had gained extensive experience targeting complex, adaptive international organizations that were skilled in using technology and had extensive resources (i.e. drug cartels and – what Braun describes as the wave of the future – terrorist/drug cartel hybrids such as the FARC.) The DEA turned some of its weaknesses – its relatively small size and low profile and the limitations of being a law enforcement agency – into strengths. Because it was small and low-profile it could practice patience in its investigations and develop appropriate (and creative) techniques. The DEA didn’t have the budget to develop or access to the top intelligence systems (satellites etc.) and it learned that HUMINT (infiltration) was the best way to get into the drug cartels. Here, counter-intuitively, the DEA’s status as a law enforcement agency served it well. Informants (usually lower-level criminals who were given a choice between being charged or turning informant) were carefully vetted, because the DEA agents knew that the informant would eventually have to testify in a U.S. court.
Because of the international scope of drug trafficking, the DEA has the largest international law enforcement presence of any U.S. agency (87 foreign offices in 63 countries) and these offices are staffed by agents who are operationally active with their international partners. (Braun stated that there was one office where the DEA was not operationally active, but wouldn’t say which – I am guessing Venezuela.)
Braun explained the international world of illicit activity, which relies heavily on ungoverned spaces, where both organized crime and terrorists can flourish. Here the DEA had to adapt. All illicit activity is united by money. Previously agents followed the drug trail – Braun urged them to follow the money trail instead because it allowed them to peer into multiple sectors of illicit activity.
While the issues surrounding organizational adaptation were interesting, Braun had many other points to make. He discussed how the FARC is the case study for the evolution and (hopefully) dissolution of a hybrid terrorist-criminal organization that can be adapted to the Taliban. He mentioned the Madrid bombing as an example of low level drug dealing supporting terrorism, and the DEA’s efforts to take on this new threat.
When asked about legalization, Braun explained that this will lead to massive levels of addiction. After the Civil War opiates and cocaine were legal and about 1/200 Americans was an addict. But, like pretty much everyone who has looked at the issue, Braun stated that more treatment for drug users would be helpful.
Braun certainly did not say this, but there are reasons to be skeptical of whether law enforcement response to drug trafficking is effective at reducing the drug supply. But it is, in some regards, a moot argument. First, because drug cartels have a deleterious effect on lawful government and therefore are a serious problem in their own right and secondly, as a moral issue, because people engaged in illegal activity should be punished.
DEA as Diplomatic Back-Channel
Finally, Braun was asked about collaboration between the DEA and the Iranian counter-narcotics organizations. Iran shares a border with Afghanistan and has a growing epidemic of drug use. Because of the ongoing dispute between the U.S. and Iran direct cooperation is impossible, but Braun noted that they have third party interlocutors that can relay valuable information. This raises an interesting possibility of the DEA serving as an alternate channel to regimes with which the U.S. has estranged relations.
There is some talk in Washington of engaging Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez by trying to restore DEA operations there. Back in 2005 Chavez revoked diplomatic immunity for DEA agents in Venezuela (he accused them of spying, plus the U.S. had revoked the visas of Venezuelan officials in DC.) This effectively shut down the agency’s operations. Since then Venezuela has become a leading conduit for drugs to Europe. Chavez is beginning to take pressure from the Europeans about this and – on occasion – turned drug dealers over to other countries. Reinstating the DEA could be useful to everyone and create a pragmatic alternate channel to Caracas.
Great Analysis on an agency that is very much forgotten in the GWOT equation. Bravo!
Excellent article. I also read the articles on the Islamic State of AFghansistan by your counterpart there on the original home blog page. Excellent work! Keep it coming!
Thanks for the generous comments. I’ll try to keep it up!
Great article!! I would like to make one quick comment with all due respect. I was an intelligence analyst for the DEA and DEA stands for Drug Enforcement Administration, not Drug Enforcement Agency. I am sorry but because I was an employee it just happens to be a pet peeve. Again, great read!!!!
Thanks for the warm words. I fixed my error (I left the post title as is because it refers to agency in a generic sense – not in terms of a specific group.)
have some fresh data for you
2 part series on Indian Muhihadeen & Russian Mafia updates on Social Mapping – See Guardian Excerpts for Russian Mafia Leadership . Gangsters Inc. site also.
some newer PKK updates
I have some newer data for you on the site about DIY and the BHE concepts. Look at the U-tube tags at the top that have jet turbines on it. It is what we will need for BHE technologies and my hybrid version of the X-rep firing systems to capture insurgents or kill them. It also is described for under $2,500 a unit we can constantly bombard any target with aerial burst rounds or HE rounds. See my weapons tags on my site also for the smart bullet technologies that is the forefather idea for the MLRS airburst rounds I describe.
Check out “My Blogroll” also . I have some older posts there on time date stamped research on my DIY projects of this nature for the bomb bots non-lethal technologies in the beginning stages and also the bhe technologies research you are seeking. Hope it helps!
Al-Qaeda chemical expert believed killed in Pakistan: officials
There was no immediate confirmation from the US-led coalition in Afghanistan or from Washington. Umar’s wife and children were believed to have been injured …
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Afghan drug lords hire foreign chemists to make refined heroin
Financial Times – London,England,UK
By Jon Boone in Kabul Drug lords in Afghanistan, where poppy growing has soared in spite of the billions that western powers have spent in trying to stamp …
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Al Qaeda chemical expert ‘believed killed in Pakistan’
Sify – Chennai,Tamil Nadu,India
He worked at a chemical weapon laboratory set up by Al Qaeda in Afghanistan before the US-led forces ousted Taliban from power. His death was incorrectly …
While opiate addiction can be a personal tragedy, I don’t see blocking addiction in Iran as a high US priority.
In fact, it seems that the overall strategy for the US dealings with Iran is to wait for the regime to implode. Creating more and more Iranian drug addicts seems to serve that goal.
The flip side is that means cash in the hands of Afghan opiom farmers and traders. The latter are usually identified as Taliban although I’m a bit skeptical.
The Iranains are plauged by heroin just like the rest of the world. The only good that comes from it is Morphine.
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Check out my Rc Hellicopter. It has laser scopes, multiple rounds for explosive shotgun shells, regular shotguns shells, and taser x-rep bullets. It is also capable of doing DIY suirvailence for under $250.00 with GPS datalogger & digital camera hardired in. I also have the jet turbine technology that will blow your toys into the dirt, speed wise!
We could track down enemy hellicopters or small planes at our leisure with no radar pings since it is such a smal toy and cost em $350,000 to $1,000,000 a pop. China,Columbia, equador,iran,north korea,belarus, and Russia will look, listen, and learn quick if aggression is ever encountered by the BHE american models I am talking about here. I also have thougt up somehing usefullas a self destruct feature for missles or mortars if the guns run out or are inoperable as a dire last option. I think if we get the mold right on some of this we can keep it under $2,500 a module applicable also for the Iraq and Afghanistan and South America Platforms as well. See here:
Tomorrow I will be speaking to intelligence in my home area so if it comes up I can explain mroe then at 1:00 when I am meeting up with them. If the company in Austin is worthy of amking an offer and it is a reasonable one I might consider contracting the job into a reality. With nightvision added in on the HARV we might see anewer variant beyond the shadow, predator, ravens, and other variant drones in action. A hoovering one with jet turbines that can kep up with some planes or pass them if necessary. Also it can ttrack down cars or insurgents with lethal or non-lethal force. You have my cell . You may text or call me on this issue. I can sign the paperwork as soon as Sarurday if this is a serious offer.
This was not something born overnight. My bhe concept has been brewing since 2005. i am just adding in each mod as it becomes cheap real world technology that is allready pre-developed to keep r and d to zero cost. That is an important factor in getting funding aproval from the DOD and gteting several mods of the BHE into the battlefeild, in the backs of commercial airplanes for ani-terrorism purposes, and deploying them also in the invisible lines if necessary in mexico and cansda area. http://blog.360.yahoo.com/blog-O1ahRPI8er4gvVWAGF6W_kZB?p=486
It was first conceived to catch insurgents with the taser-x reps, but now that we can add in more fun stuff and the technology is all there and not on drawing boards, we have many more uses for the bhe's I speak of.
beyond a lot of typoes , one more thing before i log off… It is the concept of a hellicopter that can go autonomous or semi-autonomous by manned control. I will not discuss the antennas or how it is controlled for security purposes , but if you are serious and part of an american contracting force applicle to a dod project I can school you on this topic and save you an innumerate amount of money on this drone concept. Let me know if you like the idea of an autonomous suirvailence drone that can seek, capture, hunt, kill, and survail fro under $2,500 and stay airborn at jet speeds for quite a while if necessary, or just hoover and rotate in and out in swarms if necessary to enforce say quamaas rockets, enemy bombers, insurgents, drug smugglers, airport terrorists, urban combat areas,caves with insurgents hiding in them,track down boats at ports, fly inside a house and seek out snipers… The thoughts for homeland security are endless… Need I say more?