in the news, as Pakistan’s Prime Minister tours Washington and protests U.S.
drone strikes in his country. These protests are a bit pro forma, as it is
pretty clear that the U.S. is carrying out these strikes with cooperation from Pakistan. Sharif is
caught between U.S. security priorities and his own population’s preferences.
He silently cooperates and publicly complains. Angela Merkel of Germany is
basically finding herself in the same spot with NSA wiretapping. But without
Snowden, the wiretapping may have continued below the radar, drone strikes are
much harder to hide.
perennial hobbyhorse of mine, that U.S. counter-terror policy is becoming toodependent on drones. Not that I’m opposed to drones, they are obviously an
invaluable tool, but right now it appears to be the only thing in our toolkit
and, as they say, when you have a hammer every problem looks like a nail.
U.S. seems free to hammer away, but if there is one lesson in life, everything has
a cost or, as a better writer than me once wrote:
that shall he also reap
Remarkable advances in
precision munitions, sensors, information and satellite technology and more can
make us overly enamored with the ability of technology to transform the
traditional laws and limits of war…. In reality, war is inevitably tragic,
inefficient and uncertain.
another obsession of mine. The people of Pakistan assume that their government
is corrupt and manipulated by foreigners to grind the Pakistani people into
poverty. While this is not the case, one can certainly understand how
Pakistanis might come to believe this – particularly with drones operating from
and within their territory.
against the Pakistani terrorists, but drone activity is simultaneously
undermining the Pakistani government. Long-term, fostering a stable not too
awful Pakistani government ought to be a U.S. priority – because the whole country is just a few steps from being a giant basket-case, which brings much bigger problems than terrorism.
his work and had cited it in my own work on Lashkar-e-Taiba (which found that
traditional counter-terror strategies had limited efficacy). In a nutshell,
Shapiro states that terrorist groups – because they have to operate covertly –
face a lot of organizational challenges to maintaining command and control. For
an organization to carry out complex operations requires a lot of organization
which forces the leadership to effectively exercise control through paperwork.
But these mechanisms of control are a treasure trove for intelligence agencies.
Further, the great fear of terrorist leaderships is losing control over their
units. Al-Qaeda documents have endless disputes about money – operatives
spending too much and leaders not providing enough – as well as tactics.
alternative to simply killing group members. Spreading stories about corruption
and other forms of impropriety could do more to reduce operational efficiency.
It wouldn’t necessarily be easy. But
leaking information about a group, or spoofing their internal electronic
communications should be well within the capabilities of Western intelligence
agencies. And it is probably a lot
cheaper than drones.
decision-making standpoint) is how it gets inside the decision-making cycles
and makes the political leadership seem flat-footed, inept and prone to
over-reaction. This approach is an opportunity to turn the tables and get
inside the terrorists’ decision-making and organization and twist them up.
not be appropriate in the Pakistani hinterland. Literacy is low, and running a
public diplomacy campaign would be by word or mouth, which requires extensive
on the ground knowledge. But that doesn’t make it impossible and it is at least